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IN THE SOPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---DAVID M. STAUFFER and CONNIE A. 
STAUFFER, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
and Cross Respondents, 
RUSSELL CALL and VELMA CALL and 
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Respondents 
and Cross Appellants. 
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
BRIEF FOR PETITION 
ON REHEARING 
Case No. 15468 
Appellants filed their complaint seeking specific per-
forrnance of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Alleging respondents' 
and petitioners' maliciousness in refusing to execute deeds pur-
suant to that contract and irreconcilable differences between the 
parties, appellants also sought an equitable partition of properties 
between the parties. Prior to trial, appellants also sought, in 
the alternative, compensation for improvements rnade on portions of 
the property. This claim was later withdrawn. 
Respondents answered, denying any malice or ill-intent 
toward the plaintiffs, and affirmatively alleging that they had 
diligently attempted to complete the negotiations contemplated by 
the contract. Respondents further asserted that the contract, as 
Written ~ as contemplated by the parties, violated the Statute 
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of Frauds, and that parol evidence was not competent to 
cure :· 
defect. Lastly, respondents counterclained for nesne rent , 
s 1c:! 
those general areas to which access had been sporadically den:, 
them by appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Appellants filed their action in March of 1973, 
By August, 19 7 3, six depositions had been taken, including cne 
from each of the four parties to the initial contract. (R.1~' I 
et.seq.-295) 
In April, 1976, respondents, petitioners herein, me::; 
for a partial summary judgment. (R.75) This matter was callel 
for hearing on April 15, 1976; the depositions were published,j 
the testimony of the appellants' surveyor was taken. That tra: 
script appears in the record as the Reporter's Transcri~, ~: 
twenty-three pages long, and ends as follows: 
THE COURT: Alright, thank you, gentlemen, 
and the matter is submitted, subject only to your 
filing memoranda and the Court will rule on it. 
MR. BISHOP: Thank you. 
MR. HUGHES: Thank you. (R.296 at 22) 
Subsequently, memoranda, as requested, were submitte:! 
the respective parties, with appellants filing affidavits in ' 
opposition to the motion. (R.77-98; 107-141; and 162-183) Ir 
. c,.j 
early October, 1976, Judge Burns overruled and denied respon · 1 
motion for summary judgment, setting the matter for pretrial c 
November 11, 1976. (R.185-186;190) 
The case was subsequently tried to the court on May 
eleventh and twelfth, 1977. The district judge viewed all tho 
-2-
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exhibits and observed the demeanor and judged the credibility of 
witnesses. Despite sixty-three objections to the introduction of 
testimony, the court took evidence and heard everythino the parties 
said and did proferred by plaintiffs-appellants to r-rove their 
contract. (See Appendix) Though respondents objected nine times 
to several areas of examination on the basis of the parol evidence 
rule or the Statute of Frauds, each time respondents' objections 
were overru 1 ed. (Id.) The only testimony not received was that 
proferred to show improvements, this due to the fact that plaintiffs-
appellants had withdrawn their claim for compensation for improve-
ments and they conceded that the improvements were not offered to 
~ow or delineate the so-called boundaries of the parcels allegedly 
~rchased. (T.122:15-123:7) Furthermore, many of the improvements 
~ncededly were made after the lawsuit had been filed. So exhaus-
tive was the trial court's inquiry that midway through trial, on 
recross by respondents'-petitioners' counsel, Mr. Bishop, counsel 
for plain tiffs-appellants, objected to further testimony on one 
alleged boundary as cumulative, indicating: 
MR. BISHOP: Objection, your Honer, that is 
we have been over this four or five times. (T. 162:4-5) 
Ultimately, the trial transcript comprises 294 pages. 
After plenary trial, the district judge exercised his excl~sive 
provincel/ to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and found 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract unenforceable. Specifically, the 
trial court noted that the document presented to the court failed 
~ describe with particularity any tract of land.~/ The parol 
testimony of the parties was contradictory, and the exhibits 
-3-
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preferred and received by the court did nothing to clarify~ 
ambiguity. Plaintiffs'-appellants' main exhibit, Exhibit 2 . 
'·j 
shows that there are no walls and wire fences or any boundar:;; 
around the two homes which enc lose any acreage. Appellants e':' 
asserted that one parcel, bounded only on two sides by a fenc' 
and designated by them as containing 18. 3 acres, was the ~1 
parcel to be retained by respondents-petitioners pursuant tot: 
document drafted January 2, 1969. Further, plaintiffs'-appe!:I 
proposed boundaries for the home parcels rarely followed fence; 
wal 1 s at al 1, al though a few straight and sporadically interse:j 
fences are depicted nearby. Lastly, a large fence, located c:j 
southern portion of the exhibit was not even located on the 
property in question! 
The trial court also found that all the parties exec:j 
the January 2nd document with the expectation that boundaries I 
would be agreed upon, and that appellants moved onto the prw' 
knowing these matters were unsettled. The court further founc 
that the respondents made several trips to Utah to settle the 
boundaries, but that there had never been a meeting of the mine 
of the parties as to the nature or extent of the boundaries' ; 
location.1/ 
Lastly, the court noted that appellants had voli;nta::' 
withdrawn that portion of the complaint alleging respondents f 
f n accordt:' "unlawful, wrongful, and malicious ref'.lsal to per orm 
to the written document. ii Al 1 the parties, the court held, '' 
come before the court in good faith)/ And, while the trial cc.~1 
, poradic found that respondent~ had knowledge of appellants s 
-4- d 
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I 
I 
:j 
I 
:j 
.,, 
occupation cf the premises, it did not find respondents had con-
sented to the same. There is ample evidence in the record to 
support that distinction. 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 75, URCP, appellants designated the 
Record on Appeal on October 24, 1977. (R.287) Simultaneously, 
they filed their certificate that a transcript had been ordered. 
(R.288) The district court clerk then transmitted to the Supreme 
court the following nine volumes: Two volumes of court records, 
all six depositions taken prior to the overruled notion for sum-
mary judgment, and the Reporter's Transcript of the summary 
j~gment proceedings. These were all filed in the Clerk's Office 
in Salt Lake City on November 22, 1977. 
In December, 1977, Willard R. Bishop, Esq., counsel for 
appellants, checked out these nine volumes and had them trans-
mitted to Cedar City, Utah, some 280 miles from the Court. 
~b~quent thereto, two more volumes were filed in Salt Lake City 
as wpplemental to the record on appeal: (1) An Order executed by 
Judge Burns extending the time for filing the transcript of trial, 
docketed on December 19, 1977; and (2) The transcript of trial, 
docketed January 27, 1978. 
Mr. Christiansen, Judge Burns' court reporter, provided 
~lli counsel with copies of that trial transcript, so neither 
counsel checked it out from the Supreme Court Clerk. By pre-
arrangement bio;tween counsel, the nine volumes were trar1sferred 
from Cedar City to St. George for •.ise incident to the preparation 
of respondents' brief. Subsequently, by stipulation, the exhibits 
-5-
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were forwarded to the Supreme Court. The nine vo 1 urries co 
mpr1,_ 
the original record on appeal were not returned until Jul y, 11' 
This case was set for argument on October 10, i 978 . 
Justice Ellett, subsequent thereto, checked out only nine of~ 
eleven volumes of the designated record on appeal. Apparent!;·, 
the last two volumes were never removed from the Clerk's offic: 
The Supreme Court Opinion was filed on January 9
1 10• 
Pursuant to Rules 76(e) and (f) of URCP, petitioners' counsel, 
., i 
the basis of concurrent obligations, received an extension to'j 
this brief on or before February 13, 1979. 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
The Supreme Court, apparently due to the inadvertent 1 
shevelment of the designated record on appeal, seemingly viewed 
case without the benefit of the supplemental record, includinq 
. 1 . 6/ tria transcript.- The first paragraph of the Opinion, simi:d 
I 
others therein, confuses the parties and states that appellants! 
respondents, were to retain approximately forty acres of farm!::, 
Furthermore, the payments recited as made in that paragraph ard 
incorrect. These misstatements, however, are probably insigni'.:I 
Of more significance is the body of the Opinion whk 
never clearly delineates the standards of review applicable to 
judgments after trial. Noting the on-going disagreement of~ 
parties, the Opinion only briefly al 1 udes to the trial court': 1 
I 
having taken parol evidence with regard to the language of the I 
contract and the subsequent communication and conduct of t~ 
parties. Thereafter, the Opinion takes judicial notice of ai 
f h ·tate or. increase of land values in the southern regio~ o t e ~ 
-6- d 
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to ~potnesize that respondents could stand idly by, bargaining in 
Wd ~ith and hoping for a "mighty windfall." The Opinion fails 
to note that the trial court explicitly rejected that hypothesis 
f . d. 7 I and made a contrary in ing.-
Having once fixed the position of the parties within this 
~pothesis, the Opinion then proposes a theory of recovery, part 
performance, that was never pled, ~ tried by consent, and 
never raised on appeal. Part performance, the Opinion reasoned, 
takes "the matter" out of the Statute of Frauds, and is disposi tive 
of the case. 
Ultimately, the thrust of the reversal assumes the 
existence of sufficient fences and stone walls never sh'Jwn at 
trial by which the descriptive boundaries are to be located and 
instructs the trial court to allow appellants their day in court 
~a take the testimony of what was said and done - something the 
trial court had already exhausti veiy accomplished. Thereafter, 
ilie Opinion instructs the trier of fact to decide the legal 
~~ription of the land purchased and order the same conveyed to 
appellants - this, despite the trial court's express finding that 
ilioogh the parties all contemplated an agreement on the boundaries, 
"oo ~bsequent agreement, oral or otherwise, was ever reached that 
resolved the ambiguities ... ~! 
It clearly appears that Justice Ellett felt that the 
trial court had ruled on the basis of the summary judgment tran-
script and the other vol ume3 of the record he viewed. The Opinion's 
remand, according to one recent decision, in fact ?CStures the 
Part 1· e ~ · . h , . . 1 9 I ~ as it t ,ere nad never zeen a tria .-
-7-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Petitioners, on rehearing, request that the Sup~~ 
Court re-examine the entir~ designated record on appeal, Pet; 
tioners request that the Supreme Court scrutinize the hvooth. 
-· "E. 
nature and thrust of the judicial notice taken, and the p~~~ 
of taking the same without notice to petitioners. Petitioner: 
request that the Supreme Court re-examine the standard of r~~ 
mistakenly applied to evaluate this case. Petitioners regues: 
that the Supreme Court evaluate the doctrine of part performa:: 
which, as a prerequisite to its invocation, requires a complet; 
contract and meeting of the minds, in light of the trial cour: 
findings that no such event ever took place. Petitioners reqc: 
the Supreme Court to review its position as advocate in not or.: 
proposing sua sponte part performance as a theory of recovery, 
but, without notice or any argument thereon, finding it dispos: 
tive of the case. Petitioners request that the Supreme Coort 
examine the logic of an opinion which hypothesizes the potent!: 
for bad faith, and then rules as if the case before it fit the: 
I 
hypothesis. Lastly, petitioners request that the Supreme Ccu::' 
examine the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits which 
clearly display the paucity of fences, walls, or other natura:, 
boundaries to demarcate the alleged boundaries of appell~U' 
purchases. 
01 timately, petitioners seek reversal of the Opinicr 
which apparently allows the district judge to create fur t~ 
parties a contract, previously found non-existent, and then 
judicially enforce that contract as created.lQ./ 
-8- d 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is perhaps repetitious to state facts supplemental to 
those found and entered by the trial court in petitioners' favor. 
Nonetheless, an overview of the facts may effectively serve to 
highlight the testimony forming the basis for the lower court's 
findings, insofar as the Opinion seemingly ignores them. 
In 1959 the petitioners, Russell and Velma Call, pur-
chased approximately 400 acres of property in Washington County in 
an area generaly known as Anderson Junction. ':'he farm they 
purchased was bisected by old U.S. Highway 91 and on each side of 
~e highway was located one house, the larger to the east con-
structed of rock, and the smaller to the west constructed of 
brick. The surrounding area has an occasional roe!< wal 1 and some 
~wadic fences. As indicated by Exhibits D-2 and D-3, much of 
the land had been used for farming, with some having been set 
aside for orchards):.:!) Irrigation water for all the land was 
supplied primarily from a single wel 1. 
~hough this purchase was consummated in 1959, the Calls 
never mo1red to the 1 and, nor have they ever 1 i ved on it. 
In 1968 the plaintiffs-appellants visited the Anderson 
Junction area while vacationing in Utah. Basically they obtained 
00iliing more than an idea of the general lay of the land. Mr. 
Stauffer came once again at ChristMas of 1968, but again only got 
a general idea of the lay of the land. (T.20:11-14) On his last 
trip, however, Mr. Stauffer, a real estate agent with an inactive 
lice;ise, obtained some blank Uniform Real Estate Contracts ante-
c~ent to a meeting with the Calls at the latter's residence on 
.... 
-9-
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January 2, 1969, in Santa Maria, California, apr;roxir.iately Snr 
miles from the subject property. (T.17:6-12; 75:29-76:]]; ll:: 
23: 4) 
On January 2, 1969, the parties basically sat ar . 
ounc 
1 
large table with Mr. Stauffer and Mr. Call the primary partic;. 
pants in the preparation of the document executed that d ay. 
(T.64:14-69; 139:11-14; 140:24-141:15; 232:20-21) 
The completed contract appears as plaintiffs' Exhib::
1 
17. The conveyancing clause of the contract states as follows: 
Witnesseth: that the seller for the consideration herein I 
mentioned agrees to se 11 and convey to the buyer, and the 
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to 
purchase the following described real property, si~a~ 
in the County of Washington, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Andersons' Junction, more particulary described as folk" 
see enclosed legal description.* Stauffers to purchase 
two houses using the natural boundaries which is approxi· 
mately ten ( 10) acres collectively plus approximately 1/\ 
water rights. Calls to retain the fenced natural ~rn 
ground on the SE South side from interstate freeway I 
(which is approximately forty acres) plus 2/5 water right; 
The remaining ground SE of the old highway to be STAUFFER~ 
along with the two houses. STAUFFERS to purchase 1/2 of 
al 1 remaining property to be owned as tenants in common 
with CALLS. 
I 
The above description was based on an initial assuwl 
that U. S. Highway 91 ran east and west, insofar as it went frc 
California to Utah. (T.236:6-14) All of the parties that test 
I 
fied, particularly Mr. Stauffer, the real estate agent, underd 
that the boundaries of the parcels to be purchased by the stai;;I! 
* Attached to the Uniform Real Estate Contract is a two page 
document entitled "Legal Description" setting forth eight h 
specifically described and surveyable parcel of land, toget ::,, 
with water rights. At trial, plaintiffs conceded t~ese de~c0;,'. 
tions did not de fine the property they were purchas1;ig' bu 
the sum total of all the Calls' property. (T.65:7-141 
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Unde+-ermined, important, and sub-iect to fu-ture negotiation. were - -
(~. 6 s:7-14; 80:30-81:23; 82:27-2'1) The use of infinitives within 
the docu 111ent, ~, STAUFFERS to purchase and Calls to sell and 
~ and to retain, further evinces the precatory intent of the 
· Mrs. S~auffer also clearly understood and testified at parties. 
trial that the boundaries of the parcels to be purchased were 
still subject to negotiation. In reference to the January 2 
meeting, she stated as follows: 
We agreed to agree, because we were trying to get along. 
(T.170:14-15; see also T.170:1-30) 
On January 2, the Calls also understood that they would 
have to come to Utah and meet with the Stauffers to work out the 
boundaries. (T.244:15-22; 266:10; see also Finding of Fact No. 5) 
Insofar as Mr. Stauffer was presently teaching school rather than 
selling real estate, the parties tentatively agreed to meet during 
Easter of 1969 to work out the boundaries. (T.66:30; 244:8-26; 
and 266: 17-21) It cannot be gainsaid that as the boundaries of 
the property circumscribing the homes and the 40 acres to be 
retained in fee by the Calls remained uncertain, the balance of 
~e property description implicitly remained equally nebulous. 
On February 12, 1969, appellants wrote the Calls 
~dicating only that they were planning on visiting Anderson 
Junction to go into the homes and do "a lot of looking around". 
ID-13) At the trial, Mr. Stauffer testified that by D-13 he 
notified Mr. Ca}l of the Stauffers' plans en moving furniture 
C:nd starting reno7ation of the ho;nes, prt=parato:cy to his ,,J..fe""' 
occupation of the saMe. (T.85:2-14) The letter also requested 
bn 
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that the Cal 1 s execute a notice attached thereto indicating t:, 
a sale had been consummated. Mr. Cal 1 never signed that noti: 
Though Mr. Call did not expect the Stauffers to mov, 
onto the property until the boundaries were settled, he disco"'! 
during Easter of 1969 that Mrs. Stauffer had already t~~~s 
sion of the small home. ( T . 2 6 6 : 4-14 ; T . 3 ') : 1 9 ) At tempted neg:-
tiations to determine the boundaries at this time were fruitk 
and Mr. Call returned to California, as did Mr. Staufferto'.:·i 
teaching school. At trial, though it was stipulated thats~1 
made several improvements on the land, their attorney also~ 
that the improvements did nothing to aid in the determination: 
boundaries. (T.122:15-123:33; see also T.190:9-192:20) The 
subsequent possession by Mrs. Stauffer was sporadic, both int.' 
terms of time and in area occupied. An early affidavit of Mrs. 
Stauffer indicated that from August 1971 to January 1973 she 
resided in California with her husband. (R.24,~4) At trial1: 
Stauffer testified similarly. (T.217:28-218:3) On the dayo'. 
trial, in 1977, Mr. Stauffer still resided in California ands:j 
I 
taught school there. (T.16:26-28) I 
Pursuant to the docur:1ent executed on January 2, 1%' ! 
payments were tendered and received through September of 19Jl.: 
(T.41:6-14) To negotiate the boundaries, Mr. Call came toAnl;:· 
son Junction six times, spending twenty-one days away ttoowril 
j' I 
1969 alone. Mr. Stauffer testified on cross that Russell Ca.· 
came up to the property two to three times a year, mainly to 
1 
settle the boundaries. (T.245:17-20; 85:28-87:6) At trial Ci 
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testified that all of the money he had received had been expended 
in making such trips. (T.266:25-28) 
Though negotiations continued, no agreement was reached 
on the boundaries in 1969, or in later years. (T.250:15-20; 
T. 2so:23-29; and 252:2-11) The trial court specifically found 
that al though discussions took place, no agreement was ever 
d 12/ reache .-
Sometime in late 1972 or early 1973, Mrs. Stauffer 
rewrned to Anderson Junction. Despite the fact that the contract 
~rportedly transferred only approximately l/5th of the Junction's 
water rights, she filed documents with the State Engineer's 
office claiming all of the water. (T.150-151) With her hands 
already soiled by this deception, Mrs. Stauffer subsequently con-
tacted an attorney who forwarded several deeds to the Calls, 
requesting their execution of the same. (See Exhibit C attached 
to Complaint at R.17) Mr. Call took these deeds to a civil 
engineer and, upon seeing what they described, refused to execute 
them. Thereafter a survey map "commissioned by and prepared for 
the Stauffers" was mailed to the Calls, with a second demand that 
the Calls execute deeds upon the threat of litigation. (R.17-18) 
At trial Mrs. Stauffer testified that her survey as 
Platted followed little piles of rocks placed on the property in 
1972 by her and Mr. Call in an excursion over two hours long. 
IT.1~-~; 132:12-13; 133:2-134:3) Unable to explain 
the inconsistency between this story and her prior statements 
under oath, on cress examination, she admitted that some of the 
boundaries were set arbitrarily by her surveyor. (T.ll2:7-9; 
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135:22-136:5; and 158:19-27) Mr. Gale Day, Mrs. Stauffur• 
----'---=:....:::..::~~~ 
surveyor, was never called at trial to corroborate n'e 
- r story, 
Conversly, Mr. Call categorically and emphatically denied suer 
field trip. (T.252:20-27; 252:28-253:5; and 253:30-254: 6) :>.,, 
trial court specifically rejected Mrs. Stauffer's story wheni· 
found that no agreement was ever reached resolving the ambiguc 
land descriptions. Finding No. 7. 
The principal problem with the Stauffer survey is~ 
it unilaterally supplies descriptions neither amicably settleq 
contained in the Uniform Real Estate Contract of 1969, in vioil 
of the parol evidence rule . ..!11 Furthermore, as platted, the 
survey expresses little more than the Stauffers' self-interest, 
and a very real proclivity of Mrs. Stauffer for overreaching. 
but one example, both Stauffers maintained throughout trial fr 
i 
the 40 acres of farmland to be retained by Calls consisted of, 
I 
parcel platted by their surveyor as containing only 18.30 acw 
(T.83:19-23; 98:11-16; ~ D-2*) 
Examination of the Stauffer survey reflects the part:l 
I 
discovery during Easter of 1969 that there are no fences or nd 
boundaries which effectively enclose any area as designated inj 
document of January 2, 1969. Further, while the Opinion indid 
that natural boundaries consisted of stone walls and wire fen"'. 
examination of this survey, coupled with the Stauffers' testirl 
reveals that few of the boundaries on the parcels as platted J 
followed any such demarcation. Around the small house, for ex 
ex'i 
* Note that D-2 and P-18 both depict the Stauffer surveY 1 .,'1' 
for different markings put on them during the course of tna 
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not one of tl-:e boundaries of parcel 1 follows a fence or wall. 
A parcel 3.dJacent to the small house (parcel 2) has only one 
boundary co-extensive with a fence or wall, and in that iTlstance 
:ails to fol low the same when such wall curved to the southeast. 
Mr. Stauffer recognized these problems and further clarified that 
many parts of the boundaries had never been discussed. (T.73:9-
28) 
The land around the large house (parcel 3, as designated 
by the Stauffers) was also arbitrarily designated. While one of 
its boundaries follows a fence, the other three were arbitrarily 
located by the surveyor. (T.82:4-15) A lengthy fence shown to 
the south of both D-2 and P-18 was located on property owned by 
Owen Cot tam. 
At trial Mrs. Stauffer was cross exaI"lined relative to P-
94, an illustration she prepared representing her pictorial 
understanding of the boundaries in 1971. The differences between 
her drawing and the survey prepared for her by Gale Day in 1972 
are striking by comparision. (See P-24; and T.172:22-176:21) 
While Parcel No. 4 as reflected on D-2 and P-18 is not 
bounded entirely by fences, those exhibits fail to show another 
fence to the north and east of that parcel, which is depicted on 
a survey prepared for the petitioners by Marion Malnor, a licensed 
surveyor. (D-3) All of the parties were aware of this fence, and 
the appellants knew that the property within the same had been 
farmed, perhaps even by Peter Anderson, the original owner. 
IT· 9 2 : 18- 2 8 ; 9 3 - 9 5 ; 9 7 : 6 ; 9 8 : 2 9 - 9 9 : 7 ; 1 3 3 : 2 6-1 3 4 : 6 ; and 1 6 7 : B-3 0 l 
T~~h the outer fence ~ook in some B.L.M. ground, the app~lla~ts 
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could never accept Calls' position that it was this ~n~ t' 
na: 
enclosed the 40 acres of farmland he wished to retain. Notao:, 
using a ridge to the east of old U. S. Highway 91 as one boun;: 
·1 
the same having been used by appellants in their designation 
parcel 4, the area designated by Call, less approximately Sad 
1 
would have comprised approximately 42.93 acres. 
The survey prepared by Mr. Mal nor, nonetheless, is i.' 
., 
as objectionable as the survey prepared by Gale Day. As draft,! 
it re fleets nothing more than a surveyor's interpretation Of(! 
i 
possible description under the terms of the contract. At tria:I 
petitioners preferred that Marion Malnor would testify ~~4 
familiar with the land, it was, nonetheless, impossible fur~ 
survey anything on the basis of P-1 7, the Uni form Real Estate : 
Contract dated January 2, 1969. It was further proferred that 
Mal nor would testify that both surveyors' descriptions were 
possibilities under the document and neither could be said to:: 
more accurate than the other. Understanding 
testimony, appellants waived their right of 
the proffer was accepted. (T.276:30-278:2) 
: 
the thrust of thi:j 
cross examination J 
As neither party would accept the other's designatic~ 
boundaries, litigation ensued. During the litigation Mr. and .. 
Call, who could ill-afford the travel and expense, quit-clairne! 
whatever interi:!st they had to Sunset Canyon Corporation, whicn· 
solely owned by Dexter Snow of St. George. Sunset Canyon cor~· 
tion t·ook the property subject to whatever interest the plaint:: 
had purchased and not in derogation of their title. ( T. 267:20· 
f the fl. rst pretri''.! Negotiations continued, but broke down a ter 1 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
;975. Trial took place on May 11 and 12, 1977. The testimony 
ferred therein only accentuated the ambiguity of the January 2, pro 
1969 , document and made patently obvious the disagreement between 
the parties. This, the court so found. 
BASIS FOR PETITION 
POINT I 
THE OPINION VIOLATES RULE 12 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, OF THE 
CONS7ITUTION OF UTAH IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE 
OF A MATTER NOT THERETOFORE SO NOTICED IN THE 
ACTION WITHOUT AFFORDING THE RESPONDENTS A 
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT INFORMATION 
RELEVANT TO THE PROPRIETY OF TAKING SUCH JUDI-
CIAL NOTICE AND TO THE TENOR OF THE MATTER SO 
NOTICED. 
A. The Due Process Safeguards 
The Utah Rules of Evidence were adopted by the Supreme 
Court to be effective July 1, 1971, pursuant to the rule-making 
~ftr entrusted to the Court by Section 78-2-4 of the Utah Code. 
Rule 12 ( 4) of those Rules specifically refers to those standards 
oi due process afforded all parties prior to a reviewing court's 
taking judicial notice. In particular, that Rule states as 
follows: 
A judge or reviewing court taking judicial notice under 
paragraph ( 1) or ( 3) of this rule of matter not theretofore 
so noticed in the action shall afford the parties reasonable 
opportunity to present information relevant to the oroerietx 
of taking such judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter 
to be noticed. (Id., emphasis added) 
The salutary purpose of the above Rule becomes clearly 
evident from this case. Embodying those standards of due process 
ijJh affordable to litigants under Article I, Section 7 of the 
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Utah Constitution, the Rule essentially precludes appella~ 
advocacy affecting vested rights without the opportunity fur 
interested parties to be adequately heard. 
In the instant case, the Opinion's author, sans a~ 
hearing, took judicial notice as follows: 
This Court takes judicial knowledge of the fact th t 
land values in the ~rea increased greatly since the con~ro: 
was made. By refusing to agree on the exact description, 
the land sold and in which plaintiffs were placed in posse· 
sion, the seller could hope for a mighty windfall by se11': 
it at its enchanced value to others. · 
The phrase in Rule 12, "the tenor of the matter to be noticec", 
particularly applicable to the above paragraph of the Court's 
Opinion. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridge 
Edition, (1976) defines "tenor" as follows)i/ 
(1) General course or strain; general direction; rno~m 
continuance; (2) general character or nature; (3) thrt 
course of thought which holds on or runs through the whole 
a discourse; general course; drift or direction of though: 
purport; sustance. 
In the above instance, the notice taken serves only:: 
introduce a tainted theoretical situation, Justice Ellett:~ I 
sponte postulating petitioners' possible refusal to bargain in i 
good faith. Beyond re-posturing the previously innocuous.equi·1 
table position of the parties, the Opinion's judicial notice I 
surprisingly assumed a hypothetical situation contrary to an 
1 
express finding of the trial court, which states: I 
The Court finds that there was a justifiable dispute ast.~1 
the existence of the boundaries, that payments were ma~e 1~ 
kept under the contract, and that both plaintiffs andf ettl 
ants asserted their claims before this court in good ai ·1 
(Finding No. 13, P.261) I 
I 
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B. ~he Thrust of Actual Bad Faith or Fraud 
In State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951), 
Opinion drafted by Justice Crockett held that the value of per-an 
sonalty about which no evidence had been preferred could not be 
·udicially assumed in reaching a legal conclusion. Nonetheless, 
in Flick v. VanTassell, 547 P.2d 204 (Utah 1976), this Court indi-
cated it might, on rare occasions, examine things outside the 
record if an obvious injustice or fraud would otherwise occur. 
see also Paetross v. Board of Commissioners, 555 P. 2d 281 (Utah 
-
1976) • 
The applicability of actual bad faith to real estate 
contracts otherwise uncertain has long been recognized by the Utah 
supreme Court. In Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915) 
the Supreme Court in the body of its discussion quoted Roberts on 
Frauds, §135, as follows: 
To cal 1 anything a part performance, be fore the existence of 
the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be part 
performance is established, is an anticipation of proof by 
assumption, and gets rid of the statute by ju~ping over it, 
for the statute requires proof and prescribes the medium of 
proof. 
Thereafter, however, the Adams Court intimates that the foregoing 
statement of law may not be hard and fast under peculiar circum-
stances. 146 P. at 466. Further, that the Statute of Frauds will 
not be employed to shield a fraud is an oft-quoted maxim in the 
law. Courts unerringly, however, fail to postulate whether bad 
Wlli would breathe certainty into a description otherwise uncer-
tain, or rather simply give rise to an action at law for damages. 
Regardless, while factual circumstances of bad faith might excuse 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
some extrajudicial examination with notice to the parties 
speculation on bad 
the litigants, has 
I f 
faith or possible fraud, even when inv·t 
l ed: 
been sagaciously rejected by this Court. 
Pioneer Finance & Thrift Co. v. Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P.: 
389 (1968). 
C. The Indefensible Use of "What If" In the Decision-
Making Process 
As indicated by Justice Wilkins in dissent, "[t)he 
suggestion in the majority opinion that the sellers refused tc 
agree in bad faith and in hope of windfall profit is simply un·' 
justified by the evidence." Further, that suggestion is expre;: 
contrary to the trial court's finding, which is amply supporte;i 
the record. Such judicial notice as taken here seemingly sern:' 
but one purpose and that is to place the parties before the Co[ 
in a hypothetical situation as if bad faith had occurred and ttJ 
to rule by so positioning the parties. E. Wayne Thode, profes;I 
I 
of law, has indicated that the use of a hypothetical case to 
d t · · f t · · d f ·bl l S / ~h th t f P 011 e ermine cause in ac is in e ensi e .- T e rus o r ·'r 
Thode' s criticisms in the area of tort law is no less applicab:,; 
I 
I 
I 
here; judicial inquiry is not illuminated by postulating what 
might have happened under other circumstances and then rul~ 1 
as if those circumstances had occurred. 
It should be further noted that the Opinion, while 
taking judicial notice of present land values, fails to take 
notice of what those values were in 1969. It is equally pJausi: 
that Mr. Stauffer, having recently been to Utah prior to Janua~i 
2, 1969, and having held a real estate license, had peculiar 
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knowledge enabling him to construct a bargain unconscionably 
~vorable to himself. The comparison of land values, however, 
never came up at trial because the issue of bad faith was never 
appropriately presented to the court, the facts clearly showing 
~at petitioners came to the court with clean hands and in good 
faith. See Finding No. 13, R.261. 
D. The Duty of the Appellate Tribunal 
The Opinion's taking of judicial notice without affording 
the petitioners an opportunity to be heard cannot be passed off as 
~mless error. The thrust of that notice colors the entire 
Opinion; to reach the same result, but delete the offensive para-
graph on rehearing, would do both this Court and the parties liti-
gant a gross injustice. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, speaking for 
the Supreme Court of the Onited States, and construing provisions 
similar to the due process clauses of the Otah Constitution, 
indicated that the necessity of a hearing prior to an appellate 
court's taking judicial notice is one of the "rudiments of fair 
~~assured to every litigant." Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 301 o.s. 292 at 304-305 (1937). Ohio Bell 
subsequently formed the basis of the advisory comments applicable 
~~le 20l(e) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which closely 
parallels Rule 12(4) O.R.E. applicable in this jurisdiction. 
Again, the pejorative nature of the judicial notice 
taken on appeal cannot be ignored. The indication that the sellers 
~id!_y b:z waiting _for ~~indfall assumes an underlying scheme 
d' lrectly contrary to the record and the express findings entered 
~ ~e trial court. A careful reading of the Opinion reveals that 
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to its advocate-author, the hypothetical case became that 
Posi: 
in which the parties were fixed and affected the ul tiriate dis~c. 
tion of the case. No notice regarding the nature and tenor 
0
, 
those matters judicially noted was ever tendered to petitione:: 
their counsel. 
In summation, the Utah Constitution and accompanyina 
code charge the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court 
I 
with administering, and creating where necessary, a vast bodyc·. 
substantive and procedural law by which it creates a tradition· 
justice in the State of Utah. The Utah Rules of Evidence adopt 
in 1971 prescribe a system of evidentiary rules by which~· 
standards were afforded parties litigant to avoid surprie~ 
injustice. Most of these rules prescribe the standards by whic' 
the courts control its officers in their efforts to afford thei: 
clients a day in court and empower the judiciary to limit, Jar~:1 
based on a long and developing tradition of common law, the int: 
duction of evidence that might be false, unsubstantiated, withe. 
I 
foundation or only marginally relevant. A few, among them Rule 
12, exemplify those very notions of "notice" and "an opportunit 
. I both manGl!j 
I 
to be heard" by which the very meaning of justice is 
and measured. Should the Utah Supreme Court, at this juncture, i 
there fore, choose to ignore or otherwise bypass the thrust of t'I 
same, though embraced with words,! 
SiMply stated, the Opinion's iud 
Rule, then the essence of the 
will be emaciated by action. 
f un· I 
notice, and the tenor or fair import to be derived thereo 1 
d ambl. ent in whic~ fairly characterized my clients and create an 
When in fact tr.', the Opinion ruled as if something had occurred 
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trial court found it had not, As an officer of the Court, I ask 
r ehearing of this entire case, or, in the alternative, an :or a 
opportunity to be heard, pursuant to Rule 12, pertaining to the 
~wre and tenor of the judicial notice which colored this Opinion. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD 
OF REVIEW TO THIS CASE ON APPEAL DUE TO THE 
INADVERTANT DISHEVELMENT OF THE DESIGNATED 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
As stated earlier in this brief, two volumes of the 
designated record on appeal were never removed from the Clerk's 
office. One of those two volumes was most likely the trial tran-
script supplementally filed in January of 1978. The Court's 
discussion of the evidence below can be extracted largely by 
reference to the briefs and the other nine volumes initially filed 
with the Court. The Opinion's thrust, however, was to afford the 
appellants their day in court, something that had already occurred. 
It is inconsistent that Justice Ellett would knowingly only par-
tially review the record; and procedurally he would not require 
a case to be re-opened had he known al 1 the evidence was in. 
A further comparison of the standards of appellate review will 
reveal that Justice Ellett inadvertently felt that on the record 
before him, this case had been submitted after summary judgment. 
A. Appeals After Plenary Trial 
First, petitioners recognize that in equity, pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme 
Court may review both the facts and the law. Nonetheless, on 
appeal after trial, the Court will generally defer to the trial 
----
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court's findings. BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, No. 15593, fji,. 
'·. 
October 24, 1978; Foster v. Blake Heights Corporation, SJO p· 
''· 
815 (Utah 1974). This standard has been variously phrased ft:·' 
drawing all inferences from the evidence in a light favorable· 
the findings to simply assuming the trial court believed that 
portion of the evidence which supported its findings and susta. 
ing the lower court's judgment, if possible, on any legal grci;:· 
applicable from the record. 
Secondly, trial courts are al lowed exclusivity in ru:J 
on the credibility of witnesses. Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 1f: 
332 P.2d 981 (1958); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d, 
(1962). Furthermore, as appellants waived cross-examination 
regarding respondents' surveyor's preferred testimony that ne::· 
parties' survey, which surveys were radically different, could 
said to better describe the property contained in the documen: I 
drafted January 2, 1969, the lower court's findings in accord::: 
with that testimony are unassailable on appeal. Russell M. f'i:1 
Co. v. Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380, 325 P.2d 908 (1958). 
i 
Matters beyond the record are not considered, nor arc !
1 
theories not presented below and raised for the first time on 
appeal. See Point IV, infra; Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 1' ' 
P.2d 598 (1970). 
B. Appeals From Summary Judgment 
In contrast to the above, in appeals from sumr.iary 
i 
men ts, largely based on the salutary principle that parties st.c' 
not be summarily denied their day in court, all inferences are: 
I 
drawn in favor of the losing party. As succinctly stated in, .. 
-24-
• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
earlier decision, the pertinent inquiry 
is whether under anv view of the facts the plaintiff ~o~ld recover. It is acki'.10wledged that in the face of a 
motion for dismissal on summary judgment, the plaintiff is 
entitled to have the trial court, and this court on review, 
consider all of the evidence which plaintiff is able to 
present and every inference and intendament fairly arising 
therefrom in the light most favorable to him. (Abdulkadir 
v. western Pacifi51Railroad Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, at 57, 318 P.2d 139 ( 1957) . ..:!:._ 
On appeal from summary judgments, any plausible theory, 
even if raised for the first time, may be considered if fairly set 
furili in the substance of the pleadings and affidavits. Rich v. 
~, 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 1976). Similarly, to afffirm summary 
J~~ents on appeal, this Court must conclude there is no unresolved 
issue of material fact, the solution of which would be required for 
the verdict as rendered and judgment. National American Life Ins. 
Co. v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 
(1965). Alternatively to that requisite finding, the Supreme 
Court must remand the matter for trial. 
C. Procedural Posture of the Opinion 
An analysis of the Opinion in light of the above is en-
lightening. While summarily reciting the essence of the trial 
court's findings, the Opinion fai 1 s to indicate that there was na 
evidence to support the same or further delineate where the lower 
court erred in taking or refusing testimony to support contrary 
conclusions. Instead, the Opinion infers the possibility that 
Petitioners might have idly refused to agree to a final descrip-
tion of properties in bad faith. Once having imaqined this equity-
shi ft· · . . 
- ing inference, the Opinion then proposes a theory of recovery 
net raised in the pleadings, not presented to the lower court by 
"" 
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consent, nor presented on appeal, part performance. Ultimate: 
the Opinion remands the case, instructing the trial . 
court to ti 
testimony as to what the parties did and said. This has alre,! 
'1 
occurred, and all litigants rested. 1 
i 
Clearly, Justice Ellett did not, when drafting this I 
Opinion, have the trial transcript before him. Instead he ru> 
that appellants, having been denied their day in court, shouli, 
afforded the same, and thereafter instructed the lower court :·j 
what legal theory it could grant specific performance. This(! 
should not knowingly compound that initial and inadvertent er;, 
by refusing to rehear this matter. 
POINT III 
THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR 
OF LAW IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF PART PER-
FORMANCE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
A. The Doctrine of Part Performance does not take 
"matters" out of the Statute of Frauds. 
Utah has long recognized the doctrine of part perfor· 
mance. Its application, however, has been used only in accorcct 
I 
with the principle that as a prerequisite to its invocation,a[ 
contract between the parties must first be shown. For example,, 
Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 ~5 ( 1915), the defendant, I 
resisting ejectrnent, produced the following agreement in writ!': 
October 19, 1907. Received ofH. W. Manning$30as.:. 
payment of 30 acres of land. Price to be $100 for said'' 
D. c. Adams 
The defendant testified at trial that he went into pos~ss~ 
1907, and had used the land consistent with its only purpose, 
I .·I 
pasturing of anir.ials. The trial court accepted Manning 5 ev. i 
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and awarded him a decree of specific performance. The Utah Supreme 
court, however, noting that Adams had owned more than 30 acres in 
1 ~e vicinity, held that plaintiff's contention that the descrip-
ti~ contained in the memorandum was insufficient "must prevail". 
Pertinent to the defendant's reliance on part performance, the 
Adams Court stated as follows: 
-
The first essential, therefore, is to establish that there is 
a contract. Since the receipt referred to is utterly insuf-
ficient to establish a contract, it must be established by 
other competent evidence. Has respondent produced evidence 
by which a parol contract of sale is established with the 
clearness and precision which is required in courts of equity 
where specific performance of parol contracts respecting the 
sale of real estate is sought? All the authorities are to 
the effect that such contracts must be clearly established, 
and we are firmly committed to that doctrine. 148 P. at 466. 
The Adams Court then issued the following caveat regard-
~g the admission of parol evidence to establish contracts otherwise 
violative of the Statute of Frauds: 
[U]nless the courts are very careful in the admission of 
parol evidence and in acting upon the mere inherent proba-
bility as such appear to the courts, they will, in equity, 
enforce parol contracts which are clearly within the statute 
as readily as courts of law enforce all other contracts and 
will thus entirely fritter away the statute of frauds. 
The thrust of Adams clearly is that clear and certain contracts, 
not "matters", are taken out of the statute by part performance. 
The caveat in the Adams case relative to taking parol testimony to 
~~rwise establish an uncertain contract has been reduced in 
~furence to land descriptions to a rule of evidence in the State 
ofotah. In Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026, 
ll973), this Court stated that rule succinctly as follows: 
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to supply, a 
description of lands in the contract. Parol evidence will 
not he admitted to complete a defective description, or show 
-27-
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the intenton with which it was made. Parol evidence 
· a · ;= · h mav used for the purpose of i· enti~ying t e description c ·: 
in the writir.g with its location on the ground, but no~t'. 
the purp<?se of as7ertaining and 107ating the land abo~t .;'. 
the parties negotiated, and supplying the description th· 
which they have omitted from the writing. There is a 1;: distinction between the admission of oral and extrinsi~ · 
evidence for the purpose of identifying the land describ; 
and ap~lying the ~escription to t~e ~rop~rty, and thu~ 
supplying and adding to the description ::.nsufficient and· 
on its face. ' 
In the instant case, though parol evidence was libera 
introduced over objection ,121 the parol evidence received only 
highlighted the insufficiency of the contractual description,: 
intent to negotiate boundaries, and the continuing disagreement 
the parties. Trial, in fact, revealed little more than the pat 
city of contiguous fences on the ground and that the parties 
vigorously disputed the areas referred to in the contract of 
purchase. 
The fact that appellants in the instant case sporad· 
ically occupied two homes on opposite sides of old U. s. Highwa 
91 located at Anderson Junction does not aid, as Justice Ellet' 
suggests, a judicial deterl'!1ination of what approximate 10 acres 
with those two homes. For, as stated in Adams, possession must 
taken ". . . in pursuant of the parol contract proved; that sue' 
possession was notorious; that it was exclusive and of the~ 
tract of land which was the subject of the contract . · ·"· rn 
P. at 467 (emphasis added). A perhaps clearer statement of~ 
foregoing doctrine is found in Campbell v. Nelson, 102 Utah Ji, 
d' fi' 125 P. 2d 413 at 415 ( 1942), wherein the Utah Supreme Court 1 " 
entiates acts of part performance from the establishment of the 
contract itself as follows: 
-28-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
until the parties have agreed as to the terms, there is not 
an enforceable contract in fact, and partial performance 
cannot make up for the deficiency in the understanding 
"between the parties. (Id., emphasis added) 
Clearly, as the boundaries were subject to negotiation, 
~s~ssion of the homes does not aid in their discovery. 
Again, the threshold question is one of contract, and 
the~ Court's citation to Roberts on Frauds, Section 135, is 
particularly enlightening. 
To call anything a part performance, before the exis-
tence of the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be 
part performance is established, is an anticipation of proof 
by assumption, and gets rid of the statute by jumping over 
it, for the statute requires proof and prescribes the medium 
of proof. 
As to the standard of proof required for specific performance of 
such contracts, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Otah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 
at 493 (1967) sets the Utah standard: 
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and 
ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be 
~pplied by the ccurt. It must be sufficiently certain and 
definite in its terms to leave no reasonable doubt of the 
specific thing equity is called upon to have performed, and 
it must be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the 
court may enforce it as actually made by the parties. A 
greater degree of certainty is required for specific per-
furmance in equity than is necessary to establish a contract 
as the basis of an action at law for damages. 
Part performance, is, thus, not a doctrine without a 
rationally limited application. The Utah Supreme Court has 
~~~ed the universal principle that only when the parties' minds 
have met and part performance thereafter occurred may their con-
tract be removed from the Statute of Fraud's proscriptions. 
Acceptable evidence pertaining to the tract itself may identify, 
out not supply, the tract's description. Acts of part performance 
.... 
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are not a substitute for the prerequisite meeting of the mind,. 
recent case, Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P. 2a 611 
(Utah 1975), is perhaps the most precise statement to date o'.:· 
doctrine's breadth and applicability. In a unanimous opinion 
drafted by Justice Maughan, and with deference to a well-reasc:: 
note in the Utah Law Review, the Holmgren Court stated as fol::, 
An analysis of our statute, with its qualifying com-
panion allowing specific performance, in the decisionsc' 
this court, most of which, to 1964, are noted in Vol. 9 \ 
1, Utah Law Review, p. 91, give us criteria describing,. 
conditions, which must necessarily exist before an oral 
contract for the sale of an interest in land can be enfor:: 
The oral contract and its terms must be clear, defin:: 
mutually understood, and established by clear, unequivoca: 
and definite testimony, or other evidence of the same gua: 1 
In addition, there must be acts of part performance which. 
equity are considered sufficient to take the case out of: 
statute of frauds: ( l) Any improvements must be substantr 
or valuable, or beneficial. (2) A valuable consideration: 
demanded by equity. (3) If there is possession, such poss; 
sion must be actual, open, definite, not concurrent with:· 
vendor, but it must be with the consent of the vendor. l'I' 
Such acts as are relied on must be exclusively referrable: 
the contract. 
Justice Maughan's opinion is no less applicable today, t~ n~ 
stance thereof no less accurate. As stated in 73 Am.Jur.2d 
"Statute of Frauds" §401: 
Since the doctrine of part performance had its origin in .. 
equity prior to the statute of frauds, it is not surpnsu:. 
to find that the doctrine can be asserted to secure specif.. 
performance of a contract of which there is no memorandum:: 
writing, as required by the statute, only where the circu;: 
stances of the case meet the general prerequisites to equ;. 
table relief. Courts of equity decline to enforce a pare:, 
agreement for the sale of real estate on the ground of P~:;~ 
performance unless the case is clearly within ~he recog~;; 1 
principles of equity jurisprudence. The doctrine opera ae' 
if, but only if, the remedy of law by a recovery of d~rn~·,, 
or otherwise is inadequate and the contract is one whic · 
in writing would be enforceable in equity. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The contract must be fully made and completed in every 
respect except for the writing required by the statute, in 
order to be enforceable on the ground of part performance. 
The parol agreement relied upon must be certain, definite, 
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal in its terms, partic-
ularly where the agreement is between parent and child, and 
it must be clearly established by the evidence. The requisite 
of clear and definiteness extends to both the terms and the 
subJect matter of the contract. 
In light of the foregoing, it is impossible to reconcile 
the following two excerpts from the Opinion filed by this Court on 
January 9, 1979; one stating a fact, the other, this Court's 
conclusion on appeal: 
During the four years after execution of the document noted 
ante [P-17], the parties attempted to reach agreements about 
the description of the land which was sold to the de~endants 
[sic, plaintiffs). Buyers and sellers each set forth proposed 
legal descriptions, but neither would accept the other's 
designation. 
The taking of possession and the payment of $6,400 towards 
the full price takes the matter out of the statute of frauds. 
B. The trial court, on the basis of overwhelming 
evidence, specifically found that no agreement, 
oral or otherwise, was ever reached between the 
litigants resolving the boundaries. 
Petitioners ask this Court to re-examine the statement 
of ~cts recited herein, the testimony of the parties, and the 
exhibits on file as part of the designated supplemental record. 
The lower court, after hearing all of the evidence preferred 
relative to the determination cf boundaries, and the intentions 
and subsequent acts of the parties relative to the January 2nd 
document, entered a specific finding which is decisive e>f the 
'PPlicabili ty of the part performance doctrine. Finding N0. 7 
states as follows: 
-31-
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The Court finds that Russell Call made several tri 
each year between January 2, 1969, and the filing p~ to· 
laswuit in March of 1973, and that on several occao· tr.:: 
boundaries were discussed, but no subsequent agrecmsions : 
h ' -~ or ot erwise, was ev2r reached that resolved the amb· '· 1 R. 260. igu:: 
On appeal, to dispi.ite that finding, this Court mus:'. 
elude that there is no evidence in the record to support it,, 
., 
that all reasonable minds would so find. Robertson v. Hutcn:: 
560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). Clearly, no contract can be prove·! 
the Opinion's language that acts of part performance take "t:, 
matter out of the statute of frauds" is, at best, improvident 
Further, the Opinion's zeal in reaching a result ot'. 
I 
cates the problematic descriptive language with the followinc, 
commentary: 
It is clear that the Stauffers purchased the two r.c• 
and the land about them within natural boundaries amount: 
to approximately 10 acres. It is also clear that then: 
chased all of the land on the south side of the freeway,! 
and except the fenced farm ground amounting to approxfoa: 
40 acres, together with 2/Sths of the water rights. It: 
also clear that the Stauffers purchased one-half of all· 
the remaining property of Call, which was to be held as 
tenants in common. 
I 
The above simply misstates the January 2nd document's divisic:, 
water rights and directional references therein. Furthermore,! 
sufficient natural boundaries are non-existent, even as liberi 
I 
defined by Justice Ellett, the issues of which 10 acres arour:I 
homes as well as which 40 acres to be retained become the fee•. 
I 
point of the lawsuit. Even the appellants had some self-ser:r1 
difficulty with the description. At trial, they asserted thr! 
4 0 acres clearly to be retained by the Cal 1 s meant little mor' 
h 1 ' d d · d b f and on the othe:: t an a parce ooun e on two si es y a ence 
a sloping ridge comprising approximately 18.3 acres. 
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The parties' minds never met. The boundaries were never 
determined. Part performance as a doctrine is inapplicable. 
POINT IV 
THE SUPREME COURT'S SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION OF 
THE DOCTRINE OF PARTEJERFORMANCE, EVEN WERE THAT 
DOCTRINE APPLICABLE, VIOLATES LONG-STANDING PRECE-
DENT REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Contracts for the sale of interests in land under Sec-
tion 25-5-3 of the Utah Code are void unless there is a writing, 
complete in al 1 its material terms, subscribed to by the vendor. 
~is statute, commonly known as the Statute of Frauds, is basically 
substantive, not procedural. The material terms of such contracts 
have been variously described. According to Pomeroy, the five 
essential features of a contract for the sale of land are parties, 
subject matter, mutual promises, price, and consideration. Pomeroy, 
Specific Performance of Contracts, §87 (3rd Ed. 1926) ~ see also, 
71Am.Jur.2d "Specific Performance", §34 (1973). Nonetheless, the 
doctrine of part performance has been commonly used to circumvent 
the Statute of Frauds when the courts can otherwise ascertain a 
clur, unambiguous and mutually understood contract between the 
parties. Such a contract, however, must be established by unequi-
vocal and definite testimony. Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 
534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975). 
In the instant case, appellants ~ pled, even through 
Pre-trial, the doctrine of part performance as a bar to petitioners' 
defenses properly be fore the trial court and framed under the 
Statute of Frauds. The doctrine of part performance was furthe:::-
~t hied by consent to the trial court, and insofar as the 
hr -33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
district judge found that there had never been a meeting oft~.' 
minds on one of the essential elements of the contract th 
' e Pr' 
requisite to the applicability of the doctrine was lacking, c 
appeal, neither counsel raised or discussed the doctrine. ~hE 
Supreme Court, however, sua sponte, stated as follows: 
The taking of possession and the payment of $6, 400 towarai 
the full purchase price takes the matter out of the stat'Jt 
of frauds. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the princ: 
that defenses not properly before the trial court nor refun~· 
in assignments of error could not be raised on appeal. ~ 
Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940). Thus, issues, newly 
proposed after trial, were axiomatically not considered ~tlh 
18/ Court.- The issue of judical consideration of newly raised 
defenses, however, normally came as a result of zealous cooM~ 
raising the same on appeal. Meyer v. Deluke, 23 U.2d 74, 45H 
966 (1969); Davis v. Barrett, 24 U.2d 162, 467 P.2d 603, (191~1 
Huber v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 6 U.2d 15, 305 P.2d 478 (1956); 
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., 118 Utah 600,:: 
P.2d 577 (1950). The reasoning and legal function of summari! 
rejecting such defenses was succinctly stated by Justice Crocki: 
who, in Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366, 370, 482 P.2d 702 (1971), 
stated as follows: 
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue 
at the trial cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal. In Simpson v. General Motors Corporation this 
court held that a party may not inject a new doct::ine 
upon which to predicate liability for the first time on 
appeal. This cccrt stated: 
se is 
. Orderly procedure, whose proper purpo 
the final settlement of controversy, requires that 
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a party must present his entire case and his theory 
or theories of recovery to the trial court; and 
having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some 
different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion 
a merry-go-round of litigation. 
rd. at 370, cites omitted. 
An earlier case specifically applied this basic rule of 
appellate advocacy to prevent the assertion of estoppel as a bar 
~the assertion of the Statute of Frauds where there had been 
ample opportunity at trial to amend and plead that bar. Collett 
v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730 (Utah 1951). Appellants had four years 
1 to plead and argue part per forrnance, but never chose to do so. 
On appeal, Justice Ellett, sua sponte, not only proposed 
the doctrine of part performance as an affirmative defense to the 
statute of Frauds, but in fact the thrust of the Opinion found 
that the sar.ie was disposi tive of the lawsuit! It is incongruous 
that an independent Supreme Court would not only propose a theory 
of recovery, but without argument thereon, embrace the same as 
controlling, even though not raised by any of the parties to the 
appeal. This anomaly can best be explained by the fact that 
Justice Ellett felt that the trial court had, for whatever reason, 
denied the appellants their day in court, he, having inadvertently 
viewed only that portion of the record indicating that the case 
was decided on motions for summarv judgment. Had this case been 
so postured, the Supreme Court could legitimately consider that 
doctrine, if only marginally inferable from the record, to :::emand 
for trial, Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976). 
The Opinion's final instruction to the trial court to 
take evidenc<: "as to what was said and done" clearly indicates that 
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Justice Ellett inadvertently felt the trial court had prev . 
ente: 
the introduction of such testimony by summarily denying appe)),., 
., 
their day in court. In fact, appellants rested at trial, and 
their theory of recovery was ~ejected. 
The novel assertion of part performance o n appeal car; 
as a surprise to petitioners. As this Court summarily rej~b 
newly raised defenses after trial, it begs the question that thi 
Court should not position itself as advocate, both rais~g ~ 
ruling on its own affirmative defenses. 
POINT V 
THE OPINION ASSUMED A HYPOTHETICAL CASE, 
PLACED THE PARTIES IN THE HYPOTHETICAL 
SITUATION, AND RULED: JUDICIAL INQUIRY IS 
NOT ILLUMINATED BY POSTULATING WHAT MIGHT 
HAVE HAPPENED UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Counsel for petitioners has previously addresnd t~ 
Court pertaining to the anomalous taking of judicial notice of: 
hypothetical situation on appeal. In essence, the Opinion con· 
structed a paradigm comprised of five fictions: 
( 1) That the parties did not intend further negotia· 
tions on the boundaries when contracting on January 2, rn: 
(2) That the "boundaries", whether stone walls M~ 
fences, were sufficient to enable a proper judicial deter· 
mination of their nature. 
(3) That there had been a meeting of the minds oo~ 
contractual terms as to the nature and extent of those 
boundaries. 
( 4) That the fact that the sellers knew of buyers' 
sporadic occupation of the homes constituted the formers' 
consent to the same. 
. - , 1 h ing stcc (5) That tae seilers should not prevai , av , ~ 
idly by waiting for the materialization of a "mighty win 
fall". 
-36-
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With regard to the above, the trial court, after hearing 
all the testimony preferred by appellants, eliminated as a finding 
~those fictions posed in points 1, 2, 3 and 5 above. The 
~ly remaining inference not particularly ruled on by the lower 
court is No. 4. Preliminary to this discussion, however, peti-
tioners would again re fer the Court to Adams v. Manning, Campbel 1 
v. Nelson, and Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, noted supra, 
which all hold that peaceful occupation is not a substitute for 
mutual unde:!'."standing under the part performance doctrine. 
Regarding appellants' intermittent possession of some 
rather loosely-defined areas not co-extensive with those parcels 
appellants claimed below, the Supreme Court made the following two 
statements: 
Sellers were aware of appellants' occupation and possession 
of the land and of their improvements of the houses. 
By refusing to agree on the exact description of the land 
sold and in which plaintiffs were placed in possession, ~he 
seller could hope for a mightly windfall by selling it at its 
enhanced value to others. 
First, it cannot be gainsaid that the possession by appellants was 
at best sporadic until the suit was filed in early 1973. (R.24,'!!4; 
T.217:28-218:3) The above use of the passive voice, however, is 
particularly peculiar. A disinterested third party might assume 
that Mr. and Mrs. Call placed the buyers into possession of the 
homes and cert a in de fined surrounding areas. In reality, the 
Calls reasonably assumed that as Mr. Stauffer was employed in 1969 
in California, the Stauffers would not be making plans to ilT'me-
diately occupy the property. At trial, Mr. Stauffer offered D-13 
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as his notification to the Calls of his wife's plans on 1 , eavir: 
California, moving furniture and, in general starting renovat: 
of the houses. (T.85:2-14) That exhibit, a letter drafteap,. 
ruary 12, 1969, is in the file. A cursory examination of it 
reveals nothing about the Stauffers' intent to split up the,,, 
'<J 
with Mrs. Stauffer moving to Utah and making improvements, Yi!· 
(W] e are planning on going up this next Thursday the 20tt 
We plan to be going into the houses and doing a lot of ' 
looking around 
At trial, Mr. Call recounted his surprise upon di.sec, 
ing that Mrs. Stauffer had occupied the smal 1 house when he vi:i 
the property in April 1969 to negotiate the boundaries. (T.2Q:, 
14) Mr. Call further testified that he never expected the Staq 
to move in until the contract had been finalized. (Id.) Peti:J 
do not contest their discovery of appellants' occupation, and r• 
haps even initial indifference regarding the same. After all, 1 
petitioners also expected that the boundaries would be amicabl 
settled. But, to equate the petitioners' knowledge with an for.1 
consent as part of a scheme to fraudulently improve their real 
estate, is as logical as ruling that we as members of the Bar 
consent to widespread world hunger, in so far as there are none 
among us who lack knowledge of it, and most could do something 
about it. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that on appeals fro: 
plenary trials, its rulings should be confined to matters appar; 
from the record. Further, the trial court is allowed a broad 
· d d · · · wei' ghi' ng the credi· latitude due to its a vantage position in 
· onv bili ty of witnesses' testimony and in selecting that testim ' 
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h oses +:o believe in entering its findings of fact and conclu-c. 0 
sions of law. The O;?inion never states that any fi!ldir,g 3.S entered 
was not substantially supported by the record. Instead, the 
Opinion indulges in fiction upon fiction, constructing an imaginary 
matrix or paradigm in which, were this the case, the appellants 
would be allowed to prevail. Judicial inquiry into what could 
happen under other circumstances, however, is best addressed as 
dictum and not as a fulcrum to elevate disagreement and ambiguity 
wilie status of a contract before the Utah Supreme Court. There 
is no public policy to be served by creating an ad hoc ruling 
without prior precedent based upon a mental paradigm of what the 
1 facts might have been under other circumstances. 
POINT VI 
THE SUPREME COURT OFINION ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE 
OF SUFFICIENT BOUNDARIES, EITHER FENCES OR WALLS, 
AND ASKS THE TRIAL COURT TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE AND 
DELINEATE THEM; NO SUCH FENCES AND WALLS EXIST ON 
THE PROPERTY WITHIN WHICH THE PARCELS MAY BE 
LOCATED. 
The Opinion has instructed the trial court to define 
natural boundaries as stone wal 1 s and wire fences, and on that 
~sis with the addition of parol testimony "decide what was the 
legal description of the land included in the agreement to pur-
chase". The assumption that such walls and fences exist to enable 
the trial court to appropriately make this determination is simply 
contrary to both the parol and physical testimony in this case. An 
9 cnpt from the examination of the appellants' surveyor at sum-
mary Judgment is perhaps illuminating: 
'ts 
Q Could you tell from the face of this contract, from the 
legal description attached and knowing where those two houses 
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are, could you describe with certainty and as a land sur.: 
exactly what ten acres, collectively, went with t::ose t·,,.1 
houses? 
A No. I think it is impossible to follow natural b 
aries all the way around both these two houses. Thereo:r.: 
some natural boundaries adjacent to those two houses, bu'. 
all the way around the property. ·~ 
Q So you' re saying that parts could be considered as, 
natural boundary. What is a natural boundary, Mr. Day?· 
A Well, anything that might serve as a property line· 
a fence or a wall or a road or anything of that nature.· 
Q Are there more than one pas sibi 1 i ty for natural boui'· 
aries surrounding those houses? · 
A There are several different possibilities that estal· 
lishes the boundaries of this property, yes. (R.296 ati 
At trial, some thirteen months later, it is understa: 
able why the appellants did not call Gale Day, their surveyor, 
the stand. Further, the uncontroverted trial testimony of Marr 
Mal nor, a licensed surveyor, was similar to that of Mr. Day, t: 
is, that either of two radically different surveys were possiC: 
ities under the terms of the contract. In fact, as Mr. Day ir.: 
cated earlier, the description can be variously platted due to1 
paucity of fences and other natural boundaries on the ground. 
The above becomes abundantly clear upon examination c 
the fol lowing four exhibits, which should be readily available· 
the Court in the Clerk's office: D-2 and P-18 primarily depict:• 
manner in which U.S. Highway 91 bifurcates Anderson Junctionar 
separates the smaller house from the larger. A fence and ce~er' 
indicated on the southernmost portion of those exihibits are J::i 
· b , Both exn· ibi' ts clearly show' on property ownea y Owen cottam. • 
but one of the fences and walls, either by depicting lines wit: 
11" T~a" 
small x's through them or by the designation "rock wa · 
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fence not depicted thereon is located on the east side of U.S . 
. hway 91 and runs basically east to west, north of where Parcel P.19 
No. ~ is depicted on D-2 and P-18. This fence has been platted on 
0_3 and the area adJacent thereto is easily visualized in an 
aerial photograph, D-93. 
A closer examination of P-18 shows a rather sporadic 
scattering of fences to the west of U.S. Highway 91. Appeilants' 
designated parcel 2-A, comprised by parcel 2 and parcel 1 on the 
west, follows fences, walls or other natural boundaries so rarely 
that it strains credibility to believe that the Court could examine 
that document and find the appellants' version of testimony believ-
able. Clearly, the platted dimensions viewed as solid lines are 
not co-extensive with the few existing fences designated as lines 
crosshatched with small x's. On the east side of U.S. Highway 91, 
the problem is even more severe, as there are but two fences, 
neither one contiguous and one again not shown on P-18 or D-2. 
Testimony elicited at trial confirmed that all the 
parties knew the boundaries remained unsettled, subject to nego-
tiation, and that the survey preferred by appellants generally 
failed to follow any natural lines. Further, a surveyor's uncon-
troverted testimony declared that, being familiar with the land, 
ilie radically different descriptions as platted on D-3 and P-18 
~re both possibilities under the January 2. 1969, document. 
Ultimately, P-94, prepared by Mrs. Stauffer, illustrates but one 
~~idea of the possible shapes of the parcels she sought to 
purchase. Her illustration is again visibly different from the 
Platting selected by her surveyor, Mr. Day, in 1972. As the 
-41-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
surveyors both testified in the record that the determinat· 
lOn · 
boundaries was impossible, it is incongrous at best to expect 
trial court to per form this function. As it stands, therefore 
the remand not only requires the trial judge to fabricate bou; 
aries which do not exist, but to compel independent minds obv' 
·I 
far apart to agree to those fabrications; the judiciary shoulc 
cautious in eliminating the exercise of volition through t~~ 
of contractual construction. 
POINT VII 
THE JANUARY 9, 1979, OPINION IN CASE NO. 15468 
INSTRUCTS THE TRIAL COURT TO DO SOMETHING ALREADY 
ACCOMPLISHED, THAT IS, TAKE THE TESTIMONY AS TO 
WHAT WAS SAID AND DONE TO PROVE BOUNDARIES. 
In its penultimate paragraph, the Opinion instructs 
the trial court to take testimony as to what was said and done 
not to discover the truth, but "to decide what was the legal 
description of the 1 and included in the agreement to purchase.' 
Obviously, the Court has inadvertently been denied access to 
the designated transcript. An Appendix attached to this brief 
clearly outlines that at plenary trial, the lower court, over' 
objections, received all of the evidence, both documentary anc 
parol, preferred by appellants to prove the description. 
Even after admitting all of appellants' evidence, 
including that objectionable under the parol evidence rule, tr.: 
trier of fact found the substance thereof nebulous, inconsiste:·' 
' '·~ 
and legally inconclusive. On appeal, this Court mistakenly in 
that appellants were somehow precluded from introducing eviden: 
f d d · t · At no place i' n the record is pro erre to prove escrip ions. 
this true. a s to w~' Insofar, therefore, as all the testimony 
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S•id and done to prove descriptions was received, the nature was " -·----
of such further testimony to be taken is clouded on re~and. 
Clearly, this confusing instruction is due to Justice Ellet having 
inadvertently failed to review the transcript. 
7he further suggestion of the Opinion, that the trier 
of fuct take testimony and then decide the description assumes the 
~rtainty of that testimony and denies the district judge his pre-
rogative to disbelieve the substance of a witness's statement. See 
child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981 ( 1958). The lower 
court, having taken such testimony, already found the parties never 
~reed on a final description, a matter of long-standing importance 
between them. Justice Wilkins' statement in dissent is precisely 
on point: 
This case serves uniquely as an instance of appellate 
insistence that a contract for the sale of real property 
be specifically performed by the Court's supplying the 
description where the contract does not identify and was 
not intended to identify the property to be sold. 
Beyond the prophetic sagacity of that dissent, the Opinion 
also represents a unique instance in which once the bad faith of 
petitioners had been hypothesized, it suddenly became true for the 
Court. Thereafter, the petitioners' version of testimony, believed 
by the trial judge, no longer became believable or acceptable to 
llie appellate tribunal. On remand, the instruction might as well 
~stated: Do not believe the peitioners' story in this case. 
b 
POINT VIII 
COURTS OF EQUITY CANNOT COMPEL AGREEMENT WHERE 
NONE EXISTS; THERE IS NO I,EGITIMATE EXERCISE OP 
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER A STATE OF MIND. 
-43-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At trial, all of the signers of the January 2 d 
ocur, 
who were called testified that they understood that the bounc: 
would have to be settled at a future date in an amicable and 
neighborly fashion. The trial court specifically found that, 
though negotiations ensued, the same were fruitless and the C', 
eation of boundaries was never agreed upon. The Opinion has: 
instructed the trial court to "take testimony as to what was i 
and done and then decide what was the legal description of~ 
land included in the agreement of purchase." Thereafter,~ 
trial judge "should order a conveyance of that land to the 
Stauffers n 
In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d~: 
(1967), the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated: 
Specific performance cannot be required unless all ti 
of the agreement are clear. The court cannot compel the 
performance of a contract which the parties did not mutua. 
agree upon. Id. at 493, citing Bowman v. Reyburn, 155 Cc 
82, 170 P.2d 271 (1946) (emphasis added). 
The Bowman opinion, referred to in Pitcher, explain<: 
the logical and self-evident rationale for such a limitation: 
citing Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 s.ct. 178, 42 L.Ec 
584 (1897), as follows: 
'Equity, ' this court said in Hunt v. Rousmaniere' s Adm'r: 
Pet. 1, 14 L .Ed. 27, 'may compel parties to perform their 
agreements, when fully entered into, according to their j 
terms; but it has no power to make agreements for the par 
and then compel them to execute the same. The former 1:.·
1 legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and in ~ts exe'.c'.' 
highly beneficial to soc~ety. ~he latter is.without 1 ~ie:l 
authority, and the exercise of it would be highly mi~ 
in its consequences.' 
Utah courts have also rejected such judicial interve: 
. rl 
ti on disguised in the cloaks of equity primarily because it i, 
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manipulation ot" a state of mind, be it deemed the volition, will, 
~ ~ee agency of the parties. In Whitehill v. Lowe, 10 Utah 419, 
37 p. 589 (1894), for example, the Utah Supreme Court declined to 
enforce a contract for the joint operation of a mine "upon the 
basis to be agreed upon". Id. at 590. More recently, Justice 
Ellett, writing perhaps what is now the lead case, discussed the 
~inciple in Jensen v. Bouwhuis, 577 P.2d 555 (Utah 1978). 
In Jensen all of the elements to a contract, except an 
~portant provision for partial releases, had been agreed upon 
~tween the parties. The trial court, nonetheless, granted the 
purchaser speci fie performance. Regarding the partial release 
clause which had been previously left to negotiation, the district 
judge indicated he would make the agreement, and, should the seller 
stil 1 re fuse to agree, compensate the buyer. In reversing the 
!~er court, Justice Ellett clarified the legitimate problems of 
equity as follows: 
The courts have never felt that it was their duty to 
write a contract for the parties; and where the matters are 
not clearly set out, courts of equity refuse to grant specific 
performance. 
In the case of Davison v. Robbins, et al., the vendee 
was to select two hundred acres of land from a larger tract 
which was properly described. The vendee sued for specific 
performance and this Court held: 
. . . The issue was whether the description was suffi-
cient so that there was a valid contract which would be 
enforced by specific performance. This court cited 
Scanlon v. Oliver, 42 Minn. 538, 44 N.W. 1031 wherein 
the court explained the reJ.evant distinctions between 
two types of cases. In one, the contract grants one 
party the exclusive right of selection, and the contract 
thu~ provides a definite means by which the location and 
description of the land may be definitely determined 
without any further agreement of the parties. In the 
ether type, the writing provides that the particular 
-45-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
piece of property to be conveyed is to be rnutuaJJ 
agreed upon by the parties, i.e., the mode provd 
the location and description of the land is the ~d 
agreement of the parties. In the Calder case th t 
concluded that the writing constituted a valid a~· 
enforceable contract, since the agreement provided, 
the vendee was to select the land within a given ti· 
and ~othing more had to be agreed upon between t~ 
parties. 
In the instant action, the agreement in clear 
unambiguous terms provided that the location ~a; 
tion of the land to be conveyed was subject to t~· 
future mutual agreement of the parties. This writi· 
constituted a mere expression of a purpose to make: 
contract in the future, for the whole matter was cc: 
tingent on further negotiations. The trial court" 
in its conclusions that the writing constitut~ a· 
valid, enforceable contract. 
The trial court ordered tl:ie parties to agree ( somet 
they did not do in the signed document or thereafter), ar 
case they could not agree within thirty days, the j~~t 
make a con tract for them which neither had ever thought c' 
making; and if the purchaser did not accept the judge'H 
of the new contract, he, the purchaser could get the moni: 
back which he paid at the time the seller signed the Eam 
Money Receipt, plus interest. No option was given~~ 
he is stuck with the judge's idea as to what terms they 
should have agreed upon. 
This Court wil 1 not compound the error by ordering specif. 
performance. Id. at 558. 
The thrust of Jensen, that courts cannot grant~&~ 
performance of contracts wherein important matters remain unse: 
between the parties, is a fundamental principle of equity jun 
prudence. See also BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, No. 15593, an 
opinion written by Justice Hal 1 and concurred in by all justic: 
to the Court. Simply stated, the judiciary may not draft wt 
parties important provisions explicitly left for negotiationo: 
. and the: 
rewrite their contract under the guise of construction 
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;udicially compel their adherence to a contract outside their 
J 
contemplaticn. As stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d "Contracts", §242: 
courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable 
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, 
or :::cwrite contracts because they operate harshly or in-
eauita~ly as to one of the parties, or alter them for the 
b~nefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or, 
by const:::uction, relieve one of t11e parties from terms which 
he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he 
did not. 
The Stauffer v. Call Opinion does little more than to 
!~roduce the district judge as a third party to the contract 
negotiated by the parties, who all expressly understood that the 
boundaries were subject to future agreement. The Opinion's :nan-
date that the judge "decide what was the description of the land 
included in the agreement to purchase" loses sight of the lower 
court's express finding that the parties never agreed on bound-
aries, despite substantial effort. The Opinion, thus, not only 
exceeds the bounds of equity recited in Jensen, but further compels 
the petitioners to agree to a judicially imposed selection of 
boundaries. ':'his is the very mischief that equity should rigor-
ously avoid. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' initial action sought specific performance 
of a real estate contract which all the signers understood left 
boundaries subject to future negotiation. Nonetheless, one of the 
appellants moved to the property knowing the boundaries were not 
settled. Though petitioners accepted payments, they did so with 
~e canvi2ticn Lh~t the boundaries would be worked out. Nego-
t iations er.sued and were fruitless. The lower court, after plenary 
'.rial 1 fc•rnd ·::he requisite meeting of the minds on the cont:::-act 
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had never taken place. That finding is supported by substan: 
all of the credible physical and parol testimony in the recor 
Appellants conceded that their improvements were o: 
aid in determining the boundaries; similarly, improvements~ 
panied by payments are no substitute for contractual underst·· 
(1 
and assent. After plenary trial, the appellants rested, havi: 
had all their testimony proferred to prove boundaries receive 
the trier of fact. Appellants failed to meet their burden ar 
their theory of recovery was rejected. 
This Court, on appeal, reversed. Taking judicial l!J 
of rising land values, the Opinion's author hypothesized that 
petitioners could have stood idly by, re fusing to bargain in: 
faith and waiting for a "mighty windfall". Not only were pet1· 
tioners not afforded a hearing pertaining to such notice,~· 
substance of the same flies in the face of the record on app:: 
and findings entered by the lower court. 
Having once clothed the petitioners in black wool,: 
Opinion raised its own affirmative defense to the Statu~of 
Frauds, part per fcrmance, and despite the legal inapplicabi!i:.i 
that doctrine, found the same disposi tive of the case. The id 
court should, according to the Opinion, take the testimony of: 
parties and decide the legal description of the conveyance. 
1 .j this has already been unsuccessfully accomplished, the ower. 
must now simply create a contract for the parties where none 
exists and then compel its enforcement. This caprice is clear 
beyond the legitimate objectives of equity jurisdiction. 
Ultimately, it becomes clear that the Opinion's aut' 
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. t due to an inadvertent dishevelment of the records, have 
did no ' 
access to the trial transcript. The thrust of the ruling in 
is t~ afford the appellants their day in court, something 
essence 
~ fult had been summarily denied them. This inadvertent mistake 
~~ld not be knowingly compounded on rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of February, 1979. 
~r¥ 
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APPENDIX 
OEJEX::TIONS AND DISPOSITION THEREOF AT TRIAL 
Objection 
cro Bishop ' s "2\rrended I:! -
complaint & ?.ep ly 
l:l6 To Stauffer' s testinony 
of Nov. 1968 r.eeting 
J:S To Stauffer's testinony 
of Nov. 1968 rreeting 
l:l To Stauffer's testinony 
of telephone conver. 
1:11 To Stauffer' s testinony 
1:28 To Stauffer' s testinony 
of telephone conver. 
!:24 To Stauffer' s testirrony 
of Jan. 2 rreeting 
1:24 To Stauffer's testinony 
al:out OREx::: 
1:25 To Stauffer's testinony 
al:out the 10 acres 
!:9 To Stauffer's testirrony 
al:out contract 
i:s To Stauffer' s 
al:out house 
testirrony 
~:17 To Stauffer's answer 
al:out 10 acres 
~:22 To Bishop' s question 
al:out 10 acres 
~:6 To Stauffer's answer 
regarding conversation 
E:1 To StaU::fer' s answer 
al:out l::oundaries 
hi Io Sti:!uffer' s answer 
al:out l::ou.ridaries 
b 
Grounds Disposition 
RWr Ti..'Leliness Under adviserre:it ( 4: 29) 
MDH Irrelevant; :imrraterial Denied-can be renewed 
(18:29) 
MDH Parol evidence; vary con- Denied (19:8) 
tract; irrelevant; 
:imrraterial 
MDH Relevancy; rrateriality Overruled (21:4) 
parol evidence rule 
MOH Continuing objection on 
parol evidence rule 
Overruled on continuing 
objection; renew if 
appropriate (21:16) 
MDH Foundation Sustained (21:30) 
MOH Parol evidence Overruled at this poir't 
(23:26) 
MOH Docurrent speaks for itself It rray stand (24:26) 
MDH Parol evidence rule; vary- Overruled (25:27) 
ing terms of contract 
MOH Parol evidence rule Overruled (26:10) 
MOH Identity of house Court restated question 
(27:11) 
MOH Unresponsive 
MDH leading; asked and 
a.riswered 
MOH Unresponsive 
MOH Unresponsive 
It rray stand (28:18) 
leading but overrul~d 
(28:25-26) 
Court restated question 
(29:71 
It gees out (30:6) 
MOH Farol evidence rule; can't Overruled (31:5) 
~lter written contract 
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Page/ 
Line 
31:12 
31:24 
31:29 
31:23 
31:27 
34:17 
35:8 
35:12 
36:5 
36:18 
37:24 
38:11 
38:26 
39:25 
48:7 
49:6 
49:19 
50:11 
51:3 
Objection 
To Bishop's question 
To Bishop's question 
To Bishop's question 
To Stauffer's answer 
about what was said 
To Stauffer' s answer 
about conversation 
By 
MOH Leading 
MOH Foundation 
MDH Asked and answered 
MOH Unres;:::.onsive 
MOH llnres;:::.onsive 
To Stauffer's testirrony MOH Irrelevant; i.mnaterial 
about conversation 
To Stauffer's testirrony MOH Irrelevant; i.rnrraterial 
about lease of farm 
To Stauffer's answer 
about conversation 
To Bishop's question 
<.J::out Exhibit 18 
To Bishop's question 
about alfalfa crop 
To Bishop's question 
about farm land 
To Stauffer's answer 
about conversation 
To Bishop's question 
about snall house 
To Bishop's question 
about large house 
To Stauffer's testirrony 
about additions 
To Bishop's question 
about additions 
To Stauffer's answer 
about buildings 
To Stauffer's testirrony 
about boundaries 
MOH Unres;:::.onsive 
l10H Exhibit not in existence 
on January 2, 1969 
MOH Relevancy; materiality 
MOH Asked and answered 
MOH Unres;:::.onsive 
MOH Relevancy and 1TE.teriality 
to contract 
MOH Relevancy and rrateriality 
MOH Foundation 
MOH Like date identified 
MOH Unresi:ionsive 
MOH No teS~L-U::'DY about 
boUi!dari.es 
let him' (31:13) ·-. 
Sustained 
CvenuJ.ea 
Question :;· 
Bishop 131·: 
Question r. 
Bishop Iii~ 
Qtlestion :o· 
Bishop (!)~ 
Overruled 
Sustained •. 
Allowed fo:. 
purposes U 
Overruled.•·. 
Allowed-wit; 
trouble (]O:J 
Question rel 
Bishop (Ji:.: 
Overruled a:~I 
after discd 
counsel 
0ve~ed1::I 
' '"' SustalJlec "'" 
sustained J 
. ..J Question re:· 
Bishop (50 · 1 
Answer rra1· 
tine (51:11 
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!/ Groilllds 
To Stauffer's testirrony {;JOH Foillldation 
.3 a.tout cGff/ersation 
_ ';;a Bishop' s qi.:estion 
atout conversation 
.2 ro Stauffer' s testi..<rony 
a.tout ccnversa ticn 
.'1DH Foillldation 
MOH Unresponsive 
.S To Stauffer' s testinDny MOH Unresponsive 
a.tout conversation 
!9 To Bishop' s request 
that witness rrark exhibit 
To Stuaffer' s testirrony 
al:x:Jut feoce line 
l To publication of C2.ll' s 
deposition 
17 To Hughes' question 
al:x:Jut R.E. contracts 
MOH Relevance and materiality 
MOH Identity of fence teing 
discussed 
WRB Foillldation 
w"RB Witness not qualified 
to give answer 
Disposition 
Question restated by 
Bishop ( 52: 16) 
Overruled (52:29) 
Let him start his answe1 
(53:13) 
Court restated question 
(53:19) 
Overruled (54:7) 
Go into it on cross-
examination (55:10) 
Sustained (57:15) 
Overruled (76 :29) 
!l To Stauffer' s testinDny WRB Docurrent speaks for itself Overr..i.led ( 84: 25) 
al::out letter to Call 
21 To Bishop' s question MOH Framing of question Sustained (102:24) 
aJ::out natural boillldaries 
22 To Stauffer' s testi.ffony 
regarding conversation 
To Stauffer' s testlirony 
regarding visit of Call 
15 To Stauffer' s testirrony 
al::out walk with Call 
15 To form of answer by 
Mrs. Stauffer 
To Stauffer' s testirrony 
aJ::out sale of farm 
13 To Bishop's question 
25 To BishoF' 5 questicn 
lO ·;'~ Stauffer's testlironv 
·~I condition of Parcel-1 
MOH 
MOH Object as to fo:rm 
MOH Parol test:inony to 
change written contract 
MOH Like to have her mark 
directions taker1 
It goes out (103:24) 
Overruled (105:7) 
Overruled (108 :19) 
No action (109:24) 
(not fornal objectior,) 
MOH Relevancy and materiality Overruled (115:3) 
;.JDH Relevancy and materiality Overruled (115:16) 
i·1DII Parnl evidence rnle; Overnlled ( 115 : ~ 7 J 
statute of frauds 
MDH What is parcel l Bishop restated questic:n 
(117:17) 
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Page/ 
Line ~ 
123:5 To introduction of 
photographs 
141:27 To Stauffer's testinony 
al::out purchase price 
By Grounds 
MDH Relevancy and rrateriality 
MDH Hearsay 
144:25 To Stauffer's testinony WRB Already answered 
al::out fences 
162:4 To rrore testinony al::out WRB Cumulative 
boundaries 
165:13 To rrore testinony al::out \\'PB Asked and answered 
who determined boundary 
174:14 To introduction of 
Exhibit 94 
178:16 To introduction of 
Exhibit 93 
180:12 To Bishop's Arrended 
Corrplaint & Reply 
195:4 To introduction of 
Exhibit 93 (178:16) 
200:9 To Hughes' question 
on fann land 
WRB Diagram inaccurate and 
and therefore misleading 
WRB Relevancy 
RWI' Tirreliness (objection 
rrade at start of trial) 
WRB Relevancy 
WRB Repetitious 
205:16 To Thompscn's questions WRB Cross-examining witness 
al::out contract 
205:27 To Thompson's questions WRB Repetitious 
al::out contract 
215:11 To Thompson's question 
al::out deposition 
WW 
216: 1 To Thompson's question WW Repetitious 
al::out deposition 
221:14 To Stauffer's testinony ~'lr Irrelevant, ~'11r.aterial 
al::out residence in 1973 
225:15 To Call's testirrony 
al::out conversation 
226:20 To Call's testirrony 
al::out conversation 
WlIB Unresponsive 
OverruJ.ed :~8 
Overruled µ1 
Sustained i ill 
The anS111:r;P4 
(165:17) 
Overruled , 134 
and misleci1 
Court reu:P5 
ruling 
Bishop wieJ36 
to arre.ixl. : 
to grant o:~ 
(180 :12) 13 ~ 
Overruled ''14: 
Overrule:i :fo 
overruled iejs; 
overrJled .:k 
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!8:3 
CbJection 
To 'I'hompson' s question 
atout rreeting 
To call' s test:!Jrony !8:~0 
atout rreeting 
il:ll To call' s testirrony 
atout rreeting 
ll:i7 To Thompson's question 
atout rreeting 
14 :2 To call' s testirrony 
atout contract 
14:18 To Call' s testirrony 
atout conversation 
15:14 To Call' s testirrony 
alxlut conversation 
16:23 To call' s testirrony 
alxlut farm ground 
l9:7 To Thompson's question 
alxlut toundary 
15:1 To Thompson's question 
alxlut f"rrn ground 
ii:22 To Thompson's question 
alxlut farm ground 
18:14 To Thompson's question 
alxlut farm fence 
i0:18 To Thompson's question 
alxlut agreerrent on farm 
i3:12 To Thompson's question 
alxlut toundaries 
i6:5 
o4:4 
To Bishop' s questicn 
alxlut residents 
To Bishop's question 
al:out agree..rrent 
o4:16 To Bishop's question 
al:out agreenent 8/15/73 
Grounds 
Leading 
'NRB Unresponsive 
WRB Stating conclusions 
WRB Leading 
WRB Conclusion 
\'ffiB Who said what 
WRB Wants to know what they 
asked 
WRB 
WRB Leading 
WRB Leading and foundation 
\'ffiB Foundation 
\'ffiB Leading 
WRB Conclusion 
w"'RB Repetitious 
Irrelevant; imrraterial 
.RWI' Wants to know when this 
discussion occurred 
Rl'll' Jl.fter tirre lawsuit filed 
To Bishop Is cf.teStion RWI' 
al:xiut sale to Sunset Co 
Irrelevant; i.rrrnawrial 
rp. 
DispJsition 
Sustained (228:4) 
Court restated question 
(228:14) 
Sustai.~ed (228:13) 
Overni.led (231:19) 
Stricken (234:3) 
It may stand (234:20) 
Question restated by 
Thompson (235:17) 
Question restated by 
Thompson (236:25) 
Sustained (239:8) 
Sustained (245:4) 
Sustained (246:23) 
Overruled (248:22) 
Overruled (250:19) 
Overruled (253:14) 
Overruled on cross 
(256:8) 
Answer may stand 
(264;8) 
Overruled (264:18) 
Overruled (267 :22) 
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Page/ 
Line Objection 
268:17 To call's testirrony 
about Sunset Corp. sale 
269:22 To Bishop's question 
about future benefit 
284:30 To introduction of any 
evidence of Esplin 
on rresne rents 
~ Grounds 
?-WI' Four.dation 
Rwr 
\·JRB i.Jot in pleadings 
Disr<, 
~ 
AlloWed tc·. 
Bishoo reo· 
(269 :29) ··1 
Sustain · 
ea ·I 
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FOOTNOTES 
1/ Child v. Child, 8 U.2J 261, 268, 332 P.2d 981 (1958). 
2/ Finding of Fact No. 4 / R. 259. 
3/ Finding of Fact No. 7 / R. 259. 
4/ Finding of Fact No. 9, R. 260. 
5/ Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 261. 
6/ That this might occur at least on one case when over 600 
appeals are filed yearly is to be expected. 
7/ Finding of Fact No. 13' R. 261. 
y Finding of Fact No. 7' R. 260. 
21 See Justice Hall's opinion in Hidden Meadows Development 
company v. Dee Mills, et al., at p. 3, Nos. 15027, 15157, 15188, 
filed January 2, 1979. 
lO/ See Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d 61 at 63, 362 P.2d 427 
( 1961) where in the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated: 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract 
is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, 
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, 
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced. Under the 
circumstances shown to exist here, where there was simply 
some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be 
entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate 
the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and 
enforce it. 
See also Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 179, 42 L.Ed. 
584 (1897); and 17 Arn.Jur.2d "Contracts" §18. 
ll! Defendants-respondents' Exhibits 15 and 93 are aerial 
photographs of the property, while the plat map marked as Plain-
tiffs' Exhi~it 19 represents the Calls' total ownership in graphic 
form. 
l?_! 
The Court finds that Russell Call made several trips to 
Utah each year between ... •a:rnary 2, 1969, and the filing of this 
lawsuit i~ March of 1973, and that on several occasions boundaries 
were discussed but no subsequent agreement, oral or otherwise, was 
ever reach~d that resolved the ambiguities. Finding of Fact No. 7. 
D_/ See Davison v. Ro~bins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973). 
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..!_ii Petitioners are not unmindful that "tenor" has a . 
legal definition. In the evidentiary scheme, however th~ 
. . ' e I· 
of the word comports with its more commonly accepted mean'·, ina 
121 E. Wa:(ne Thode,. "The In~efensible Use of the Hypou 
Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 146 Texas Law Review 42J i'. 
464 
431 
1..§_/ 
P. 2d 
P.2d 
l]_/ 
See also, Carr v .. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 23 Utah 1,1 580 (1970); and Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah le: 
126 (1967). . 
See Appendix. 
l!!I Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, soa: 
538 (1973); State, by and through Road Commission, v. Larkin, 
Otah 2d 395, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utahi:, 
482 P.2d 702 (1970); In Re Ekker's Estate, 19 Utah 2nd 414,:, 
485 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 [! 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do herel.:y certify that on the day of February, 
1979 , I caused the foregoing BRIEF FOR PETITION ON REHEARING to be 
served upon \Ellard R. Bishop, Esq., counsel for appellants, by 
having two copies thereof delivered to his office at 172 North 
Main street, Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
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